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Abstract
The global International Financial Institutions (IFI’s) increasingly justify their
operations in terms of the provision of International Public Goods (IPG’s). This is partly
because there appears to be support among the rich countries of the North for
expenditures on these IPG’s, in contrast to the “aid fatigue” that afflicts the channeling
of country specific assistance. But do the IFI’s necessarily have to be involved in the
provision of IPG’s? If they do, what are the terms and conditions of that engagement?
How does current practice compare to the ideal? And what reforms are needed to move
us closer to the ideal? These are the questions that this paper attempts to ask, in the
framework of the theory of International Public Goods, and in light of the practice of
International Financial Institutions, the World Bank in particular. For the World Bank, a
series of specific operational and resource reallocation implications are drawn from the
reasoning.
JEL Classification: F0, H4, O1, O2
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11. Introduction
When people talk of the International Financial Institutions (IFI’s), they mean the
two Bretton Woods institutions, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank.
Of course, strictly speaking, any multilateral organization with financial operations is an
IFI—for example, the regional multilateral banks, regional monetary authorities, some
agencies of the UN that disburse funding, etc. However, in practice, by IFI’s is meant
the two global IFI’s—the Fund and the Bank. In recent years there has been growing
discussion of the role of these institutions in the provision of International Public Goods
(IPG’s). An aid fatigued public in the rich North, beset by its own internal budgetary
problems (for example, the looming social security crisis of an ageing population) and
convinced by tales of waste and corruption in aid flows, has grown weary and wary of
conventional country-specific development assistance. In contrast, the notion of IPG’s
seems attractive to Northern publics—at least their representatives have adopted the IPG
refrain in international fora.1
But what exactly is an IPG? Given the “aura” that the term seems to have
developed, there is clearly an incentive to justify any activity by any agency as an IPG,
and aid agencies have not been shy in doing this. At its most general level, development
in poor countries is being argued to be an IPG, and hence an argument for continuing
conventional aid—disenchantment with which turned the Northern
public to IPG’s in the first place. On the other hand, highly specific activities like
research into vaccines for tropical diseases are also being labeled as the provision of an
                                                                
1 The rising interest in the policy arena has led to an explosion of analytical work at the intersection of
IPG’s and development assistance: see, for example, Jayaraman and Kanbur (1999), Kanbur, Sandler and
Morrison (1999), Kaul, Grunberg and Stern (1999), Sagasti and Bezanson (2001), Gerrard, Ferroni and
Mody (2001), Arce and Sandler (2002) and Ferroni and Mody (2002).
2international public good. If we are not careful, everything will be labeled an IPG, and
the concept will lose not only its analytical cutting power, but also its capacity to
mobilize Northern resources.
This paper begins by carefully defining IPG’s and characterizing their key
dimensions (Section 2). It argues that the concept is subtle and multifaceted, and that in
practice there are many different types of IPG’s. The mechanisms for provision of these
IPG’s need to be equally subtle and multifaceted. The IFI’s have not been slow off the
mark in claiming the mantle of “IPG providers”, but the theory of IPG’s provides a
framework in which to evaluate the claims of the IFI’s for resources in the name of
IPG’s. The paper discusses World Bank practice for specific IPG’s (Section 3), and then
considers reforms to better articulate the comparative advantage of the Bank with the
requirements of IPG provision (Section 4). The paper concludes (Section 5) with an
outline of areas for further research and analysis.
2. IPG Theory
As noted above, there is an understandable tendency to fit almost any IFI activity
under the IPG umbrella—for example, financial support for vaccine research, in-house
economic research on development, capacity building for research in developing
countries, collation and dissemination of research, convening international summits on
global pollution, developing international trading mechanisms for national pollution
permits, multicountry environmental and water preservation projects, raising money
from financial markets at lower cost, disseminating and evaluating information on
3economic and financial conditions in individual countries, developing and monitoring of
banking standards, coordinating aid flows from disparate donors, etc.
It is important at the outset to clarify terms and set up a clear framework for
identifying IPG’s and their key characteristics.2  The technical definition of a pure public
good is a commodity or activity whose benefits are non-rival and non-excludable. By
non-rival is meant that one entity benefiting from it does not diminish the benefit to
another entity. By non-excludable is meant that no entity can in fact be denied the
benefit. An international public good is one where the entities in question are
conceptualized as nations rather than individuals. There are two important points to be
made with regard to these two criteria. First, although they help sharp conceptualization,
in most practical cases they will only be met partially. Second, while rivalry can be
characterized as a property given by technology, excludability is man made.
IPG’s relate very closely to spillover effects or externalities between countries, and
it is worth clarifying the concept of such international externalities. Consider a
collection of nation states that have jurisdictional authority and control over different
policy instruments within their own boundaries. However, there are spillover effects of
events and policies in one country on other countries, near and far. Civil war in one
country sends refugees into near neighbors. Carbon dioxide emissions from one country
affect all countries through their impact on global climate. Water use in one country
lowers the available water supply for others who share the same water table. Infectious
diseases incubated in one place spread to another. Financial contagion, as the name
suggests, spreads from country to country; lack of confidence in one country’s financial
                                                                
2 There are a number of studies that set out the basic theory of public goods. See for example Cornes and
Sandler (1996) or Sandler (1998) or Kanbur, Sandler and Morrison (1999).
4future may unfairly taint other countries in a peer group. Activities that mitigate negative
externalities and promote positive ones then satisfy the criteria defining IPG’s.
All of the above are examples of cross-border externalities, spillovers that are not
mediated by competitive markets. Certain key features of these spillovers will be
relevant for our discussion of IPG’s and IFI’s. The first feature to highlight is the spread
of the spillover—what sorts of countries are involved at the two ends of the spillover? It
is useful to distinguish between (i) spillovers across developing countries only and (ii)
spillovers that include both developing and developed countries. The next feature to
consider is the direction of the spillover—is it unidirectional or does the spillover go
both ways?  Characterization of this is a subtle and intricate matter, and is not
independent of the particular circumstances of time and place. The standard example of
a multidirectional spillover currently is air pollution, where developed and developing
countries are inflicting spillovers on each other. Farm protection policies in North
America and the EU, which create a surplus and depress world prices, are a
unidirectional spillover from developed to developing countries. Infectious diseases are
in principle multidirectional but in the specific conditions of today the issue is framed as
a unidirectional one—poor infectious disease control in developing countries leading
(though travel) to spread in developed countries.
Perhaps the most famous example of a unidirectional spillover, at least as it is
portrayed in much of the current discussion, is development itself. This argument is
being used with increasing force by donor agencies in general, and the IFI’s in
particular, to justify maintenance and increase of official development assistance. But
there are at least two caveats that must be registered. The first is a certain unease with
5the “there’s something in it for us” line of argument bolstering the case for development
assistance in the face of an aid-fatigued public. While recognizing that this seems to be
working at the moment, at least if statements of politicians are anything to go by, it can
be argued that this undermines the more solid moral basis for assistance based on a
common humanity and alleviating suffering.
The second caveat is perhaps more pertinent for the discussion in this paper, and is
in any case relevant to the critique noted above. This is that the whole argument rests on
the assumption that the transfer in question actually makes the recipient better off. The
theoretical literature in international economics is replete with analyses showing how the
paradox of an immiserizing transfer can occur. Indeed, one can theoretically get a
situation where the transfer makes the donor better off and the recipient worse off—and
many NGO’s have argued that this is what the aid system, bilateral and multilateral,
actually does. The evidence on the efficacy of aid in promoting development is
decidedly mixed and, before the IFI’s and other agencies are allowed to use the
“development is good for developed countries too” argument, they should be subjected
to the scrutiny of whether aid is actually good for development.3
This paper will not elaborate further on the “development and poverty reduction in
poor countries is an IPG” argument. In other words, it will not deal any further with the
generalized unidirectional externality from lack of development in poor countries to the
well being of rich countries (and other poor countries). Rather, it will focus on more
specific activities that (i) although taking place primarily in developed countries, imply a
unidirectional positive externality to several developing countries simultaneously, (ii)
                                                                
3 There is of course a huge literature on aid effectiveness. Some recent examples include: Burnside and
Dollar (2000), Tarp (2000) and Kanbur (2000).
6coordinate multidirectional externalities among groups of developing countries and (iii)
benefit developed and developing countries simultaneously, the benefits in all cases
being non-rival and non-excludable.
A leading example of the first type of public good is basic research, on tropical
agriculture or medicine or even, some would argue, on the development process itself.
Examples of the second category of public goods are regional or sub-regional level
agreements on transport or water. Finally, global mechanisms to control carbon dioxide
emissions, or financial contagion, are example of the third type of public good.
In the case of multidirectional spillovers, whether between developing countries or
between developed and developing countries, the central issue is one of coordination
failure—each country ignores the negative consequences of its actions on others. All
countries could be better off if they took this into account and coordinated their actions.
In this case it is the coordination mechanism that is the IPG. Once coordination is in
place, countries as a whole benefit, and it is not easy to exclude any one country from
this pool of benefit (otherwise why would it want to coordinate?). However, very many
different types of coordination are possible, which determine not only the total gains but
also the division of these gains. There is thus a range of possible IPG's each with
different consequences for different countries.
This last point leads to a very important consideration. Coordination mechanisms
may satisfy the technical definition of an International Public Good, but it is important
to analyze the distribution of benefits from the coordination—in particular, how are they
divided between developing and developed countries? To the extent that the benefits are
very unevenly divided against developing countries, what we might have is not so much
7an IPG as a cartel of developed countries pursuing their own interests. This distinction
between an IPG and an international cartel is well worth bearing in mind as we move to
a discussion of IFI practice.
The final theoretical consideration4 follows from the principle of subsidiarity. This
says that all other things being equal, the coordination mechanism must be as close as
possible to the jurisdictions being coordinated. Under this rubric, there is a priori no
strong argument for a global institution to coordinate the water rights problems of three
countries in Africa—rather, it should be an institution as close to the three countries as
possible. Economies of scale may suggest a regional level institution to deal with
coordination issues between countries in that region—but it is unlikely that they will
suggest a global level institution, capable of tackling coordination problems across any
group of countries anywhere in the world. Going against this argument is one on
economies of scope—that IPG issues in a particular sector (for example, health) could
best be combined under a single institution (like WHO). In practice we may end up with
a combination of regional and technical institutions to handle coordination problems
within developing countries.5  But the claims of a global institution to do all jobs should
be treated skeptically.
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One example is how exactly actions in different countries contribute to the public good. These issues of
the technology of public good provision are dealt with, for example, in Jayaraman and Kanbur (1999),
Kanbur, Sandler and Morrison (1999) and Arce and Sandler (2002).
5 This is further discussed in Kanbur (2001).
83. World Bank Practice
How does the actual practice of the IFI’s compare to the theory of IPG’s? How
much of what they do can be faithfully characterized as IPG’s? The Bank and the
Fund are of course complex entities with multifaceted operations in scores of countries
and many sectors. They are also controlled primarily by the developed countries,
especially by the G7. It will be important to bear this political fact in mind and also to be
clear which parts of their operations are being discussed (e.g. financial versus research,
country specific versus multicountry etc) and the criteria for evaluation. The bulk of the
operations of the two institutions are country specific in nature and this is unlikely to
change in the future.
In this paper we focus on the World Bank. Of its administrative budget of around
$1.4b in FY01, about half went directly to support country operations (“Regions”).6  If
we take away the “overhead” expenditure of administration, corporate management etc,
the share of country operations is even higher. This therefore raises two questions. First,
to what extent can their country specific operations take on the mantle of international
public goods?  Second, is there a case for a shift to more of their operations being multi-
country in nature, and what would this entail? Under multicountry activities, research
and dissemination of research (the budget headings of Development Economics and
World Bank Institute) account, for around $100m of the total administrative budget. The
Development Grant Facility, from which a range of global activities is funded in the
form of grants, was around $150m in FY01. “Networks” account for almost $120m—it
                                                                
6 The figures that follow are from the annual report of the World Bank (2001), Appendix 1, “World Bank
Expenditures by Program Fiscal 1997-2001.”  The table can be downloaded from
http://www.worldbank.org/annualreport/2001/pdf/appendix.pdf
9is not clear how much of this allocation is for multicountry activities and how much for
supporting country operations, but if we allocate 1 in 8 (roughly, the ratio of research
and dissemination to research, dissemination and country operations) of this to
multicountry activities, we get $265m ($100m + $150m + $15m) as the allocation of the
administrative budget to this category, compared to $805m ($700m + $105m) to country
specific activities.7
It is important to realize that any evaluation of the Bank will stand and fall, for
many years to come, by the efficacy of its country specific operations. Let us focus,
however, on the non-country specific operations. We start from IPG’s for small groups
of developing countries and work our way up to global IPG’s. What is striking is that
multicountry operations across small groups of developing countries facing cross-border
externalities are few and far between. To the extent that they exist, they are generally
outside the normal realm of Bank instruments, relying on grants from the Bank’s net
income, rather than loans from IBRD or IDA. The hugely successful River Blindness
project is often produced as an example where the Bank supplied an IPG in which (in
concert with other donors) a multi country project was put into place to counter a vector
borne disease—a classic negative externality across geographically adjacent countries,
mitigating which benefited these countries in a manner that was at least partly non-rival
and non-excludable.8
                                                                
7 Of course, this is a very rough and ready order of magnitude calculation. Sometimes under development
Economics and World Bank Institute will support country operations, just as some times under Regions
will support multicountry activities. A more sophisticated analysis can be conducted with more detailed
budgetary data.
8 Other initiatives like the regional Water Initiative for Middle East and North Africa,
http://lnweb18.worldbank.org/mna/mena.nsf/Sectors/MNSRE/AA7510D24BEE223C85256B58005A5026
?OpenDocument, are at the stage of seminars and meetings, with ‘normal” project activity projected some
time into the future.
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But there are at least two questions that arise, in light of the theoretical discussion
in the previous section. First, does the Bank necessarily have to be involved in such
IPG’s? The principle of subsidiarity suggests that it should be regional institutions that
should prima facie have the responsibility for these activities. Even if it can be argued
that at the time of the project regional institutions in Africa were not strong enough to
take over this task, and even if they are not strong enough now, should we not be aiming
for a time when they will be capable of supplying such localized IPG’s? Second, how, if
at all, can the Bank’s standard loan instruments be used in the supply of such public
goods? To the extent that they cannot, this surely implies a move in the direction of
more grant financing from the Bank as a whole. These questions will be taken up in the
next section.
Staying with multi-country coordination, let us move to the case where the
coordination required is across developing and developed countries—in other words, a
truly global coordination mechanism, the supply of which would undoubtedly count as
the supply of an IPG. The Bank is involved in a number of these types of exercises. The
global coordination (jointly with the IMF) of debt relief for the poorest countries (the
HIPC initiative) is a leading example. It is clear that even for a single debtor country
with many creditors there is a major coordination problem in debt relief, since it is in the
interest of every creditor to be repaid at the expense of the other creditors. Such
coordination mechanisms exist for commercial debt (London club) and official bilateral
debt (Paris club), but there needs to be a mechanism for coordination across these, as
well as of course for multilateral debt itself. Some of the debt issues are quite intricate—
for example, the Soviet era debt owed to Russia by African countries, while Russia is
11
itself a debtor to Western nations. The case for coordination is strong, but not without
questions. Should the Bank be involved at all or should this be left to the IMF? How can
either the Bank (or the IMF) be a legitimate coordinator between creditors and debtors
when its own debt is at stake?
A second leading example of coordination across developing and developed
countries would be the Bank’s work in the environment, especially air pollution. Global
coordination problems on the use of the seas, on fishing disputes, etc are dealt with by
specialized agencies of the UN and various trade organizations, and the Bank does not
have a major role. However, for the case of carbon dioxide emissions or ozone depletion
the Bank has taken a lead role in conjunction with UN agencies such as UNDP and
UNEP.  The Global Environmental Facility, for example, was incubated in the Bank but
it is now a separate entity, with the Bank listed as an implementing agency, through its
regular country operations in countries that participate in GEF projects. This shows
another aspect of practice that is of interest. Global coordination will often require
country specific projects. To the extent that the Bank’s country programs purposively
finance such projects (for example, the Aquatic Biodiversity Conservation project in
Bangladesh as a part of the overall objective of global biodiversity conservation) they
are part of the supply of IPG’s. But this raises yet more questions. What is the trade off
between resources for such projects and resources for national development pure and
simple? And is it better to use loan or grant instruments for such projects?
Consider now a non-rival, non-excludable and unidirectional positive externality
from activities primarily in the developed countries, or in the IFI’s, to developing
countries as a whole. One example would be generalized lifting of trade barriers, or
12
immigration restrictions against developing countries by developed ones. But the more
commonly discussed examples are basic research—for example, into tropical
agriculture, tropical diseases, or into the development process itself.
Rather like the River Blindness project, the work of the CGIAR is often used by
the Bank as an example of an IPG that it is instrumental in helping to supply. Despite the
usual problems of an ageing institution, most evaluations of CGIAR generally applaud
its achievements in helping to increase agricultural yields in developing countries as a
whole. Indeed they call on it to do more, in light of the slow down in yield growth that
has been experienced in the last fifteen years. There is a strong argument for increased
financial support of the CGIAR, subject to the usual caveats of institutional reform. By
extension, there is strong argument for the Bank to increase its support, which is in the
form of grants from its net income. But notice an interesting point. Whatever the Bank’s
initial role in getting CGIAR off the ground (it can be argued that Foundations such as
Rockefeller played an even more crucial incubating role), its current contribution is
essentially as a financier (through its Development Grant Facility) rather than provider
of substantive input (for example, based on its country operations). This raises again a
question on the link between the Bank’s role as an IPG provider and its bread and butter
country-specific operations.
Similar to the Bank’s contribution to the CGIAR, its contribution to various
proposed funds for research into diseases prevalent in developing countries satisfies the
criteria for helping the supply of an IPG. Basic research that leads to an anti-malaria
vaccine, for example, could benefit poor countries enormously. While this benefit will
of course depend on the specifics of how the vaccine is disseminated, the output of the
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research itself is non-rival, and furthermore non-excludable provided the right
institutional framework is in place that does not create private property rights in its
findings. As is well known, the development community faces a difficult tradeoff
between using the private sector’s efficiency in pursuing research goals, and giving
private property rights on the outcomes as an incentive, since the benefits would not
then be non-excludable. There is the added issue that vaccines or treatments for the
diseases of poor people may not be profitable enough. One way to square these various
circles is the well discussed device of the Vaccine Purchase Fund, which would act as an
incentive to the private sector to do basic research on poor country diseases and then,
effectively, make the findings available (at a price). From the point of view of
developing countries, the Vaccine Purchase Fund in indeed an IPG, a positive
unidirectional externality from the Fund to the countries as a whole.
But once again the question arises, is there anything other than the Bank’s
financing in the final product of the IPG? In the case of the Vaccine Purchase Fund
(rather like in the case of the HIPC fund), it is clear that the Bank’s “convening role” has
been important, that (along with a small number of individuals and foundations) it was
able to nurture the basic idea and then expand it out to other partners to the point where
it could become operational. This convening and incubating role will be discussed again
in the next section.
As a final example of World Bank practice in the supply of IPG’s, let us consider
its role in producing research on the development process itself. The World Bank, in
particular, projects itself as the “Knowledge Bank,” and sees its role as a synthesizer of
country-specific development experience for the benefit of all countries—an IPG. While
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the Fund does not project itself quite so aggressively in this mode, it offers the general
experience of its staff in a range of countries to policy makers from specific countries,
and it also has a large research department. Taking the World Bank specifically, there
are two major issues of interest. First is the actual mechanism through which the vast
amount of information generated by its operations is synthesized—much is made of the
role of new information technology in this process. But secondly there is the issue of
how and in what framework the synthesis takes place.
Leaving to one side complex technical and institutional issues of managing
knowledge flow, the central issue is that frameworks for understanding and interpreting
information and knowledge in the development process are contested. In this context,
the Bank can take an open stance of allowing a range of issues to be debated and
discussed, with dissenting voices invited and given their proper place, or it can present a
particular synthesis and stand behind it to the exclusion of other perspectives. In practice
the outcome is somewhere in the middle, with a definite stance on some policy issues
(for example capital account liberalization till a few years ago, and trade liberalization
now), which reflect and are reflected in country specific operations, but a more open
stance on others (for example, on reducing gender discrimination).
Is Bank (and Fund) research an IPG? It is clearly non-rival, in the sense that once
the output of the Bank’s research goes on to its comprehensive website, access by one
person anywhere in the world does not diminish access for another). And the Bank does
a very good job in wide dissemination of its findings. It is also non-excludable in the
sense that anyone who wishes to have access to the Bank’s research can in principle do
so. But this is a case where satisfying these technical criteria is not enough—we have to
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look deeper into the consequences of making this research available widely. The
consequences depend upon whether the research is believed, and by whom. To the
extent that there is a perception, and perception is what matters, that the research is
blinkered and dedicated to showing particular results, it will not have a general impact.
In this context, effective mechanisms of collecting, organizing and disseminating
information through electronic means can only deepen suspicion. The recent discussion
of civil society’s deep reservations on the Development Gateway is a case in point.9
The central question is whether research in institutions like the Bank, who have to
take stances and views on policy in their operations, can ever command wide enough
trust to be an IPG. This in no way to impugn the motives of the many fine individuals
who do research in these institutions. But they do face constraints, and this is entirely to
be expected in an operational organization. The point is not whether there should or
should not be a research organization in an operational institution—any such institution
will need a group dedicated to specific analysis and to interacting with outside analysis.
The point rather, is whether IFI research can claim the mantle of an IPG, and thence the
aura and the resources that flow from it in the current climate favoring IPG’s. Our
conclusion on this is a skeptical one, at least when there is a widespread perception that
the research is in service of a particular line or policy stance to the exclusion of others.
This is perhaps more likely in social science research where, unlike research in the
natural sciences, much of the terrain is contested and there is no uniform, unifying
framework in which research and its findings can be assessed.
                                                                
9 See Wilks (2001) on the Gateway for a discussion of the pressures on the World Bank from its major
shareholder, see Wade (2002).
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4. Reform to Promote IPG’s
Almost by definition, IPG’s will tend to be undersupplied in the world. And this
undersupply will often adversely affect developing countries. The World Bank is
engaged in a wide variety of activities whose direct (and sometimes indirect) objective is
to supply various types of IPG’s. Indeed, it (and other international agencies) are using
this fact of IPG related activities to argue for continued support in a climate where
conventional development assistance is out of favor. Before this argument is accepted, it
is worth asking whether there are reforms that could make the Bank better at supplying
IPG’s. The theory of IPG’s in Section 2,and the review of some examples of World
Bank practice in Section 3, suggest some useful directions.
Let us start with the (reasonable) assumption that over the next ten to fifteen years
the World Bank will essentially remain an organization the bulk of whose operations are
country specific projects and programs. As noted earlier, we do not consider here the
argument, increasingly stridently made, that since development itself is an IPG, the
Bank’s (and other agencies’) country programs should be supported as IPG’s. Suffice it
to say that the argument hinges on the efficacy of these country programs in promoting
development, and the debate on that will continue. What is important for us here,
however, is that the culture of the institution, and the bulk of its detailed knowledge and
experience, is and will continue to come from its country operations. Reform of the
Bank to promote the supply of IPG’s will have to take this basic fact on board, and
weave a pragmatic path between current reality and the ideal suggested by the theory of
IPG’s.
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Recalling the discussion of spillovers between adjacent developing countries in
Section 2, a coordination mechanism requires simultaneous actions by a number of
countries, and financing the costs of these actions, as well as the costs of the
coordination mechanism itself, is an IPG. The fundamental disconnect between the
requirements of the theory and Bank practice is that the Bank (IBRD or IDA) enters into
loan agreements with individual countries, while what is clearly needed, if the loan route
is to be pursued, are creative mechanisms whereby a number of countries can jointly be
made a loan. This expansion of the scope of Bank lending is the first implication of the
reasoning developed in this paper.
To the extent that multi-country loans are difficult to develop and roll out because
of structural impediments in a sovereign debt framework, this argues strongly for the
development of grant instruments as a normal part of the Bank’s country operations.
There is of course a big debate about whether all of the Bank’s operations, certainly in
the poorest countries, should be on a grant basis. The practicality of financing
coordination mechanisms between adjacent developing countries adds its weight to the
side of the debate arguing for conversion to grant instruments. Thus greater use of grants
is the second set of operational implications of an IPG focused look at the World Bank’s
operations.
The theoretical principle of subsidiarity states that it should ideally be regional
level institutions, not a global institution like the World Bank that should be addressing
cross-border spillovers between small numbers of adjacent countries. In the short term
there is often a strong argument for continued or even strengthened World Bank
involvement in these local level IPG’s. But over the long term there should be a
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strengthening of regional institutions to deal with these issues, through transfer of
knowledge and skills. To the extent that the World Bank’s financial resources are used
for this, they will be helping to supply IPG’s indirectly. A similar argument can be made
for strengthening sectoral organizations that are currently relatively weak but are needed
on IPG issues—health and WHO is an obvious example. Thus a systematic program of
strengthening of regional and specific sectoral organizations is thus the third operational
implication of our reasoning.
On basic research into tropical agriculture and tropical diseases, World Bank
practice and IPG theory are quite closely aligned; there are spectacular successes in the
past and promising avenues being pursued currently. An expansion of financial
resources into these operations is strongly suggested. However, there is scope for reform
of World Bank practice from a closer examination of theory and practice. First, given
that for the foreseeable future the bulk of the Bank’s operations will be country specific,
there should be a systematic attempt to feed in the lessons of country practice into these
global initiatives—this would give a substantive strategic role to the Bank over and
above its financial role. The details of this need to be worked out, of course, but the key
is the word “systematic”—the use of new technology to collect and collate information
through to global initiatives is something at which the Bank should excel.
But the experience of the various successful global initiatives highlights a second
issue. In a number of cases the Bank played a central role as a catalyst, using its
convening power, and then took a less central role in discussions while perhaps
maintaining its financial role intact. This “entrepreneurial role” of the Bank has been
useful in the past and should be maintained and strengthened. This requires a certain
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amount of “blue sky thinking” to identify problems and potential solutions, and to start
down the road of global consensus building on the issue. An expanded fund for pursuing
such innovative ideas on IPG’s, perhaps through an expanded Development Grant
Facility, is thus the fourth operational implication of the arguments in this paper.
As noted in the previous section, the Bank spends significant resources on general
social science research into the development process itself, and to dissemination of the
findings of this research. The Bank as a whole no doubt has a huge base of experience to
report on from its country operations. A systematic and independent collation of this
information would be an IPG. Reform suggests itself first of all in developing
mechanisms that will enable raw information to be accessed the world over. New
technology holds out some hope in this regard, and the Bank is already moving in this
direction. But there is the fundamental problem referred to in the previous two sections.
Social science is not like natural science. It is contested terrain to a much greater extent.
Moreover, the Bank as a whole cannot possibly be viewed as an independent arbiter of
social science research. It is owned by the rich countries, and it has operational policies
that need to be defended. These features mean that social science research done by the
Bank itself cannot fully lay claim to the mantle of an IPG. The issue is sharply seen in
much of the “cross-country regression analysis” that is done at the Bank. Whatever
one’s views on the quality of this research, there is weak comparative advantage
justification for this type of research to be done at the Bank—it does not rely on
information peculiarly available to the Bank because of its country operations, nor on
methods and techniques that are peculiar to the Bank. The fifth and final implication of
the reasoning in this paper is that more of the research at the Bank should be farmed out
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to Universities and transparently independent institutions, where at least perceived
independence will enhance its value as an IPG.
5. Conclusion
To summarize, the arguments in this paper have (at least) five implications for the
operations of the World Bank. First, the development of multicountry loan instruments.
Second, a stronger move in the direction of grant instruments, which will mean an
increased charge on net income. Third, use of grants to support build up of key regional
and sectoral organizations. Fourth, increased use of grants to support basic research
initiatives, and innovative development of new IPG’s, through an expansion of the
Development Grant Facility. Fifth, a greater farming out of social science research to
independent institutions.
This paper has only begun the systematic and detailed investigation of
international aid agencies as suppliers of IPG’s. It has focused on the World Bank, but
many other agencies—the IMF and various UN specialized agencies, in particular—can
and should be subjected to the same scrutiny. The details of the practice will differ in
each case, of course, as will the application of the theory of IPG’s in each case. Such
analysis will contribute to an overall sense of what resource reallocation is needed in
international agencies to address undersupply of IPG’s. At the same time, it will
highlight overlaps and duplications in the supply of IPG’s—all international agencies
are claming their activities are essential as providers of IPG’s, and they cannot all be
right.
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But the case of the World Bank itself, as the biggest aid agency of all, needs more
detailed analysis than has been possible here. We have used broad budget headings to
characterize country specific operations and different types of multi-country operations
that could be interpreted, or have been claimed by the Bank to be, IPG’s. With the
availability or more detailed budgets (more detailed than those available publicly in the
Annual Reports), a more careful accounting would be possible to sort out items under
country operations that should be reclassified to country specific operations and vice
versa. While this may not lead to a big change in the overall proportions, it is an exercise
worth doing. A concomitant of this exercise, however, would be a much more detailed
set of operational and resource reallocation implications than the general ones developed
here. For example, the overall set of activities currently lumped under Networks,
Development Economics and World Bank Institute need to be examined against the
criteria of IPG’s. A more fine-grained conclusion on the research budget could then be
reached.
There is, finally, a “big” question that we have left untouched. This is the issue of
the World Bank (or the IMF) as an IPG per se. The IDA part of the Bank, for example,
coordinates and acts as the channel for aid flows whose origins are not the Bank’s own
borrowing or its net income, but flows from donor countries that they have chosen to
send through this mechanism rather than through direct bilateral arrangements. It is
argued that in this sense IDA provides the IPG and, it is argued by some, because of this
mechanism aid flows are greater than they otherwise would be, and hence developing
countries benefit as well. This is a different argument from multi-country activities that
IDA funds could support, or the positive externality that country specific use of IDA
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funds generates as the country in question develops and grows. Rather, it is that this
mechanism for country specific programs is better than others, better specifically than
the alternative of all bilateral flows, and in providing this very mechanism the Bank
provides an IPG. In the end, this may turn out to be the strongest IPG argument in favor
of the World Bank.
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